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Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choice between 
Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Service provision by local governments can be delivered using in-house bureaucracies, 
private firms, and partnerships with other governments or the not-for-profit sector. This 
production decision has been a major focus of discussion among scholars, practitioners 
and political agents for the last quarter of a century. The transaction costs framework is 
an important tool to analyse decisions regarding the production of local services. In this 
paper, the authors employ this framework to analyse service delivery in Portugal and 
find that service characteristics and the local political environment play a key role in 
local officials’ choice among the three governance mechanisms to deliver public 
services.    
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Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choice between 
Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
 
Due to their level of proximity and periodic transfers of competences from the 
national government, local governments in Portugal gained importance over the past 
two decades as service providers. Their functional responsibilities have been extended 
significantly over several areas including water supply, promotion of regional 
development, solid waste collection, emergency management, health care, education, 
land use management, among many others. To cope with all these challenges, local 
governments changed from a general, multi-purpose organisation to a complex network 
of relationships with other public bodies, private agents, and not-for-profit 
organisations. 
The choice of local officials regarding service delivery options has been an issue 
of debate over the past quarter century both in the academic and practitioner literatures. 
Prior research highlights the role of service type, the level of political and administrative 
turnover, and the socioeconomic and demographic status of the jurisdiction as relevant 
factors influencing the decision (Stein, 1993; Clingermayer, Feiock & Stream, 2003; 
Feiock, Clingermayer, & Dasse, 2003; Joassart-Marcelli & Musso, 2005; Brown, 
Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006; Carr, LeRoux & Shrestha, 2009; Feiock and Jang, 2009; 
Shrestha & Feiock, 2010). The significant amount of research in the US context 
contrasts sharply with the limited scope of analysis in Europe, where most research 
focuses in dyadic choices e.g. public versus private or public versus not-for-profit 
options rather than analysing the three sectors simultaneously. One notable exception to 
this rule examines the use of mixed public-private firms as a partial privatisation 
strategy for water distribution and solid waste collection services (Bel & Fageda, 2010).  
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This work begins to fill this important lacuna by testing a transaction costs 
model of service delivery with data from municipal governments in a European setting. 
Specifically, we collected data on service provision and production choices in Portugal 
and employ these data to test a transaction costs model of service delivery options by a 
sample of Portuguese local governments. The transaction costs framework suggests that 
there are costs in adopting external solutions resulting from bounded rationality and 
opportunistic behaviour by the agents. As transaction costs increase, the production cost 
efficiency gains from externalization become less decisive. Service complexity, asset 
specificity, and the local political environment influence the level of transaction costs 
and hence the decision to externalize the service. 
The transaction costs hypotheses are tested using a multinomial logit regression 
model. This test is an extension of other efforts reported in the literature and the goal is 
to cast contracting choices as delegation decisions involving economic and political 
transaction costs. The survey of Portuguese local governments allowed us to identify a 
total of twelve government arrangement alternatives to deliver public services. These 
twelve alternatives are organized in three ‘classic’ governance mechanisms – hierarchy, 
market, and partnerships/networks – according to a set of predefined criteria. We 
measure the economic and political transaction costs involved in service delivery while 
controlling for other contextual factors affecting the decision choice. 
The first section summarizes the literature of the application of the transaction 
costs framework to the choice of service delivery mechanisms. Next, we develop the 
theory and present a series of hypotheses linking transaction costs with service 
production choices. The third section describes the context of our study highlighting 
both the historical constraints associated with production choices in Portugal and the 
relevance of this study for gaining additional understanding of local governments in 
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Southern European countries. Data and methods are presented in section four and the 
findings reported in section five. The piece closes with a brief set of conclusions and 
implications for future research.     
 
Literature Background 
The transaction costs framework (TCF) is frequently used by scholars as an 
important tool to explain the choice between different alternatives to deliver public 
services (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2008; Tavares & 
Camões, 2007, 2010). Robert Stein (1993) employs service typologies developed by 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1977) and Peterson (1981) to support the argument that 
government service delivery arrangements are a function of the nature and scope of the 
service to be provided. Ferris and Graddy (1986; 1991) point out the nature of the 
service as the main factor in decision making and highlight the challenges that local 
governments face when contracting out with private vendors.  Building on the work of 
Ronald Coase (1937) and Oliver Williamson (1981; 1985; 1996) on transactions costs, 
Brown and Potoski (2003; 2005) argue that local government choices are driven by the 
degree of asset specificity and service mesurability involved in the decision to provide 
local services. 
The key argument of the TCF states that the comparative analysis of financial 
costs of the capital invested, personnel, and property costs (production costs) is 
insufficient to justify the choice of one of the alternative mechanisms to deliver public 
services. The costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts 
with external vendors must also be considered, as transaction costs, in the analysis of 
alternative forms of production (Brown & Potoski, 2003). The decision to produce a 
service through an in-house bureaucracy, externalize it to a private vendor or resort to 
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other government or not-for-profit organisation is influenced by the transaction costs of 
service delivery associated with service characteristics and political context. Thus, the 
most appropriate governance mechanism is the one that minimizes the transaction costs 
of service delivery (Brown & Potoski, 2003, Nelson, 1997; Ferris & Graddy, 1997; 
Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse, 2007). 
Transaction costs result from bounded rationality and agent opportunism 
involved in contractual agreements and vary according to service characteristics, 
including the specificity of assets, service measurability, and the frequency of 
transactions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). Better productive efficiency can be 
achieved through private production because production costs tend to be lower in the 
private sector. However, external delivery choices involve transaction costs stemming 
from the need to mitigate agent opportunism in contractual agreements. When total 
costs are considered in-house options may actually become more efficient alternatives 
(Nelson, 1997). Empirical work by Bel and Fageda (2010) compares the use of mixed 
firms with pure public and pure private production options and finds that private 
production is less likely for services displaying high transaction costs (water 
distribution). 
The consideration of total costs involves not only the economic transaction costs 
related with service characteristics but also the ‘political’ transaction costs linked with 
the political environment of service delivery. While economic transaction costs are 
directly related to the characteristics of the goods or services being contracted, political 
transaction costs are external to the transaction but may constrain the choice of the 
production mechanism to be employed. The model presented here accounts for both 
types of transaction costs associated with service delivery choices. 
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Service Characteristics, Political Environment and Production Choices  
  
 When deciding to provide specific services, local government officials are faced 
with alternative mechanisms to produce these services. The choice involves three major 
components: the characteristics of the service, a set of external constraints, and the 
production alternatives available. This section is concerned with the first two aspects of 
the production decision. The next section tackles the last.   
 
Economic Transaction Costs 
Economic transaction costs are associated with the uncertainty involved in 
contracting with external agents (other governments, nonprofit organisations or private 
firms) for service production. Contractual agreements entail both ex-ante and ex-post 
problems derived from bounded rationality and opportunism. Adverse selection is 
associated with hiring an agent that will not fulfill the contractual terms, something that 
the hiring government cannot perfectly detect in advance due to bounded rationality. In 
order to overcome adverse selection, local officials face costs involved in the process of 
searching, selecting and hiring the agent in a context of imperfect information.  
Moral hazard occurs ex-post and can be regarded as the costs of monitoring the 
agent’s effort and/or performance. In the absence of perfect information, the agent can 
behave opportunistically by failing to upheld the terms of the contract. Monitoring 
activities entail costs that increase with service complexity, e.g., opportunistic behavior 
is easier to monitor in the case of a solid waste collection company than in mental 
health care services.  
Adverse selection and moral hazard are closely associated with two service 
characteristics: asset specificity and service complexity. In general, it can be argued that 
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economic transaction costs increase either when contracting for highly specific assets or 
when monitoring highly complex services.  
Asset specificity increases transaction costs because specific and specialized 
investments and skills are difficult to redeploy in alternative uses in public service 
production. After the first round of procurement, contract agreements for asset specific 
goods and services lock buyer and seller in a bilateral monopoly. The contracting 
government is a single service purchaser who attributes the first contract to the best 
bidder who in turn becomes vulnerable to the monopsony. Since the investments are 
highly specific the winner develops a competitive advantage over other vendors in 
future contracts. As competition for future procurement decisions is reduced, the local 
government becomes exposed to opportunism on the part of the initial winner 
(Williamson, 1985; Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006).  
The externalization of asset specific goods and services can result in a 
fundamental transformation, whereby the initial large numbers bidding is converted into 
an ex-post bilateral supply (Williamson, 1985: 61). As a result, services involving 
highly specific assets tend to be provided by hierarchical mechanisms, while services 
with low asset specificity are provided using market solutions (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1981, 1985; Ferris & Graddy, 1997; Nelson, 1997). 
Recent empirical findings point to a more complex relationship between asset 
specificity and externalization. Brown and Potoski (2003) suggest and find support for 
the idea that local governments turn to external service providers because highly 
specific assets have also capital-intensive cost structures. Shrestha and Feiock (2010) 
argue that the relationship between asset specificity and externalization follows an 
inverted U-shaped. Intergovernmental contracting is more likely at mid-range levels of 
asset specificity, while in-house production predominates at very high levels and private 
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contracting is more frequent at lower levels. Carr, LeRoux, and Shrestha (2009) find 
support for this nonlinear relationship, particularly that at very high levels of asset 
specificity local governments avoid nongovernmental producers. Based on the 
theoretical arguments by Williamson (1985) and the findings by Carr, LeRoux, and 
Shrestha (2009), we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Services involving highly specific assets are less likely to be provided by 
market mechanisms.  
Hypothesis 2: When externalization is an alternative to hierarchic mechanisms, local 
officials are more likely to partner with other governments or nonprofit organisations to 
produce highly specific assets. 
 
Service measurability refers to the degree of difficulty to evaluate service 
outcomes and monitor the performance of the agent. According to the assumptions of 
transaction costs theory, service measurability is a problem due to information 
asymmetry because the presence of both bounded rationality and opportunism leads to 
moral hazard contractual problems (Williamson, 1985). Service activities that are easy 
to measure are more suitable to be described in a formal contract and therefore more 
amenable to external production. In contrast, complex and/or intangible activities are 
less amenable to monitoring by the contractor, so transaction costs increase significantly 
for contracting out these activities. 
Past findings in the empirical literature indicate a significant degree of support 
for this service complexity hypothesis (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Levin & Tadelis, 
2007). However, recent empirical work points out that there are situations of 
externalization to nonprofit organisations, even in the case of complex services 
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(Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2008; Feiock and Jang, 2009). Presumably this occurs 
due to the fundamental differences in terms of values and goal congruence between the 
private and the public and not-for-profit sectors. Profit maximization constitutes a high-
powered incentive for private firms that can lead to a decline in service quality to reduce 
costs (Frant, 1996). The efficiency gains associated with contracting out with private 
firms, particularly in the case of labor intensive services, are counterweighted by 
potential opportunistic behavior on the part of profit-seeking firms (Ferris & Graddy, 
1986; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2008; Feiock and Jang, 2009). The incentives to 
opportunism are less prevalent in the public and not-for-profit sectors, where slack 
resources are reinvested in organisational activities or reverted back to organisational 
budgets. Hence, when externalization is considered for efficiency reasons, the use of 
network mechanisms is more likely, namely the establishment of partnerships with 
other public agencies or third sector actors.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Services that are complex and/or difficult to measure are less likely to be 
provided through market mechanisms.  
Hypothesis 4: When externalization is an option, local officials prefer partnerships with 
other governments or nonprofit organisations to produce complex and/or intangible 
services. 
 
Political Transaction Costs 
 
Political transaction costs result from the context where the service is provided 
and lead to limitations of sector choice by local officials. In other words, in the presence 
of political transaction costs local officials see the number of service production 
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alternatives reduced due to factors which are not directly related with the contractual 
decision, but stem from the context where this decision takes place. Political transaction 
costs are not ‘political’ in the partisanship sense, but linked with the credibility of the 
local government in a contractual exchange (North, 1990; Dixit, 1996).  
An adverse political environment reduces the attractiveness of service contracts 
because it creates uncertainty for potential private and not-for-profit organisations due 
to the possibility of government reneging on contractual agreements. Political and/or 
administrative instability in the local executive can adversely impact the level of 
transaction costs and reduce the alternatives regarding service delivery. Recent work by 
Feiock and Jang (2009) confirms this argument by finding a negative relationship 
between mayoral turnover and nonprofit contracting for elder services. 
Having the same executive for several consecutive terms may be translated into 
greater confidence and expectation of credible commitment to establish contracts. 
According to Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse (2003), this stability facilitates the use of 
external agents in the provision of public services. However, the same authors alert to a 
possible exception to this effect. A higher level of political instability may also be an 
incentive to the externalization of public services in order to shift blame to the providers 
(Frant, 1996; Clingermayer & Feiock, 1997; Hood, 1998). In this case, the use of 
nonprofit organisations or partnerships with other governments may be a more viable 
alternative than private firms. Local officials are able to duck blame while at the same 
time overcome the absence of private vendors willing to enter contractual agreements 
due to political and/or administrative instability. In light of these findings, we posit that: 
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Hypothesis 5: Political instability decreases the probability of adoption of market 
alternatives and increases the likelihood of using partnerships rather than hierarchical 
solutions. 
Hypothesis 6: Administrative instability decreases the probability of adoption of market 
alternatives and increases the likelihood of using partnerships rather than hierarchical 
solutions. 
 
The relationship between financial status and the decision to outsource the 
provision of public services has been a matter of strong contention in the empirical 
literature. The dominant view in the public administration literature is that adverse 
financial situations lead to the adoption of external arrangements rather than in-house 
hierarchical solutions. With reduced financial capacity, the need to provide public 
services at reduced costs leads local governments to use market and/or partnerships as 
external procurement is expected to be more innovative and cost effective (Ferris, 1986; 
Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). 
However, empirical findings in the field of economics suggest that contracting 
out at the local level may actually be more prevalent during economic upturns 
(Borcherding, 1988; Wittman, 1989; see also Pallesen, 2004). This argument underlines 
that the externalization of services to achieve technical efficiency and cost savings 
during economic austerity ignores the transaction costs associated with externalization 
decisions. When transaction costs are accounted for “it may very well make it rational 
for the city to produce the service in-house” (Nelson, 1997: 84).  
This argument is also in line with the idea that financial crises reduce the 
leverage of local governments over their options. Externalization involves unacceptable 
political and electoral risks due to the loss of political control in fundamental service 
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delivery areas. Consistently, it can be argued that contracting out is primarily a political 
decision and, as a result, it can only be undertaken when public revenues and 
expenditures are easier to increase in order to reduce public employee resistance. Where 
local public sector unions are stronger, such as in highly decentralized countries, 
opposition to contracting out may be especially vigorous during economic decline 
(Pallesen, 2004). 
 
Hypothesis 7: Jurisdictions facing fiscal stress are less likely to externalize their 
services.   
 
Control Variables 
 
Community characteristics can also affect the decision of the production 
alternative to be employed. Communities facing significant economic and demographic 
changes are more likely to resort to externalization, either through contracting out with 
private vendors or by establishing partnerships with the not-for-profit sector. 
Heterogeneous communities display increased preference diversity and citizen demands 
over local government service provision (Clingermayer, Feiock, & Stream, 2003; 
Feiock and Jang, 2009). Preference diversity in a local jurisdiction varies positively 
with the increase in personal income per capita, population growth, density, and 
urbanization. Organisation theory suggests that jurisdictions facing such pressures are 
more likely to diversify their service delivery options, since hierarchical mechanisms 
seem more appropriate for stable environments (Weber, 1947; Alexander, 1995; 
Beetham, 1991; Blau & Meyer, 1971). In dynamic environments, with greater levels of 
functional complexity, more flexible solutions are expected (Burns and Stalker, 1961). 
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Local Service Delivery in the Portuguese Context 
 
The decision to provide specific services involves the consideration of all 
possible alternatives to produce each service provided by local governments. The last 
section employed a transaction costs framework to address two important features of 
this choice: the characteristics of the service to be produced and the external constraints 
that can influence the outsourcing decision. This section is concerned with the 
production alternatives available to local government officials. The discussion is framed 
by the history and the evolution of functional responsibilities of local governments in 
Portugal.  
Local governments deliver public services using a complex set of organisational 
choices. Hierarchy is the coordination mechanism most commonly used by Portuguese 
local governments (Rodrigues, 2009) and it is consider the most natural and efficient 
way to manage bureaucratic organisations in a stable environment (Weber, 1947; 
Alexander, 1995; Beetham, 1991; Verhoest, Peters, Beuselinck, Meyers, & Bouckaert, 
2004). 
Local governments in Portugal have a longstanding tradition and most 
municipalities (concelhos) have existed with significant autonomy since the Middle 
Ages. They had autonomy to manage the council business in what concerns their land, 
commerce transportation regulations and markets, road construction and maintenance, 
local income and price taxes, police power, among others (Manique, 1989). In the XIX 
century municipal autonomy was suspended. The liberal regime attempted to rationalize 
the administrative system and to control municipalities by embracing the French 
Napoleonic structure of administration. The debate about the territorial division and 
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organisation was inspired by the French administration. Over time, centralization and 
state power turned the country into a highly centralized administrative state (Livermore, 
1976). 
The advent of the republican regime in the early years of the XX century and 
particularly the authoritarian administration of the Estado Novo (1926-1974) reinforced 
the centralized pattern of Portuguese institutions. The regime developed a corporative 
and autocratic emphasis, strengthened the importance of the administrative bureaucracy, 
and introduced institutional uniformity. During the dictatorship period, municipalities 
had limited competencies and operated as an extension of the national government. For 
a period of almost fifty years, municipalities essentially played a role as administrative 
units of the state (Opello, 1983), acting as administrative agencies organizing activities 
in-house according to a single structure model of local service delivery. 
Services responsible for the preparation and implementation of administrative 
decisions were organized as hierarchical structures, the Municipal Services (Serviços 
Municipais) (Oliveira, 1996). For services of an economic and industrial nature, such as 
water distribution, electricity, sewage, garbage collection, and public transportation, 
local governments were allowed to create Municipalized Services (Serviços 
Municipalizados), under certain conditions established by law (Pereira & Almeida, 
1985: 214). Approved by the Municipal Assembly (deliberative body), these services 
had some financial autonomy and an Executive Board, but stopped short of having 
corporate-like status, since the municipality was the sole owner and they remained 
hierarchically integrated in the municipality (Caetano, 1982). 
The democratic regime introduced in 1974 and the Portuguese Constitution of 
1976 re-established democratic local power, new service delivery roles, and financial 
and administrative autonomy. As new competences were ascribed to local governments, 
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citizens became more aware of their role and the central government started a new era 
of intergovernmental relations based on three basic principles: local autonomy, 
decentralization, and subsidiarity. 
The new functional competencies and the political, social, and economic 
development pressured the emergence of new forms of local service delivery. However, 
New Public Management ideas and organisational forms are late comers in the 
Portuguese local government scene. The continental Europe juridical tradition of 
administrative reform emphasized changes in legislation not managerial changes 
(Rodrigues and Araújo, 2006). The country’s history and political culture also 
contribute to explain this resistance to market alternatives and the predominance of 
state-oriented production choices (Tavares & Camões, 2007: 537).  
Nevertheless it is possible to identify some changes in public service delivery 
based on market type mechanisms and the use of private management tools. By the mid 
1980s, local governments began using contracting-out or franchising as alternatives to 
in-house solutions. The relationship between local governments and private agents was 
based on contractual agreements between the parties in a competitive environment.  
Since the late 1990s local governments were authorized to create Municipal and 
Inter-municipal Corporations. These have corporate-like status and administrative, 
financial and patrimonial autonomy, and are regulated by the law of public corporations 
and by the commercial society’s code. In theory, this solution resembles the use of 
externalization, since it shifts public service production to a different agent than the 
local government. However, municipal power remains untouched since local 
governments decide the creation, modification and termination of the corporations as 
well as control appointments to their managerial boards. In practice, both financial and 
personnel management are often integrated as local governments are forced to 
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consolidate accounts and employees can be transferred from the in-house bureaucracy 
to the corporation payroll and vice-versa.  
More recently, local government extended the use of partnership mechanisms to 
provide services to their citizens. Partnerships with nonprofit organisations and other 
governments are now regarded as viable options to provide municipal services, 
particularly in the field of social policy (elderly care services, child care, social housing, 
and health care). While contracting out requires special care with contractual writing, 
monitoring and evaluation activities, partnerships with not-for-profit organisations 
provide some of the market advantages, but are based on reciprocity, shared goals and 
values, and information facilitation through voluntary participation of all actors (Feiock, 
Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse, 2007).  
Local governments have also created commercial companies. In some cases, 
these new entities were created with other municipalities (Municipal Commercial 
Societies), with the central government (Public Commercial Societies), and with private 
agents (Mixed Commercial Societies). In the first two types, the split of decision powers 
indicates these classify as partnerships, while in the last case the municipality is a 
minority shareholder in a private firm.  
In sum, local government officials are able to choose from a total of twelve 
alternatives available to produce services. Not all twelve alternatives are actually 
available to all services provided by local governments in Portugal, as many do not have 
the market opportunities or potential nonprofit partners to contract with (Rodrigues, 
2009). The complete list is depicted in table 1. 
These organisations of service delivery can be classified according to broad 
governance arrangements (hierarchy/market/network). Table 1 uses a set of 
organisational features to classify each service delivery arrangement within a 
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governance mechanism. We use the direct control criteria for hierarchic type 
mechanisms (HTM), competition criteria for market type mechanisms (MTM), and 
inter-organisational cooperation criteria for network type mechanisms (NTM). 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
 
Data and Methods 
In presenting our hypotheses, we discussed several determinants of the choice 
between alternative governance mechanisms. The variables included in the analysis 
concern service features, political environment, and community characteristics 
measured by the indicators described in table 2. 
During the year 2008, we conducted an electronic survey of local government 
officials in 278 municipalities in Continental Portugal. We received 101 valid 
responses, corresponding to a 36.3% response rate. Our dependent variable is the 
governance mechanism chosen by the 101 municipalities to provide 42 different 
services. The total number of observations included in the analysis is significantly 
reduced because not all services are provided by the respondents. 
Following procedures by Brown and Potoski (2003; 2004, 2005), Levin and 
Tadelis (2007), Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, and Dasse (2007), and LeRoux (2007), 
we assess the level of asset specificity and service measurability by asking officials to 
rate each municipal service in two scales from 1 (low) to 5 (high) asset specificity and 
from 1 (low) to 5 (high) service complexity. Since both service characteristics are 
related to the provisions defined in the contractual agreement, the perception of local 
officials is most likely the best approximation to measuring these features. The survey 
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provided assistance to the respondents by clarifying the concepts of asset specificity and 
service complexity. Asset specificity was defined as (Brown & Potoski, 2005: 329): 
“• the use of a specific location that is only movable at a great cost;  
• the use of highly specialized human skills that cannot be put to work for other 
purposes;  
• the use of specialized tools or a complex system designed for a single purpose; 
• the requirement that the service reach the user within a relatively limited period of 
time or the quality of the service greatly diminishes.” 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 When dealing with service complexity, again we clarify the concept (Brown & 
Potoski, 2005: 335): 
“• government officials can easily write a contract and clearly specify the activities and 
outcomes for the vendor to perform and achieve; 
• government officials can monitor the quality and quantity of these activities and their 
outcomes;” 
Political and administrative stability are measured following a similar procedure 
as suggested by Feiock, Clingermayer, and Dasse (2003). For each indicator 
(administrative and political) we asked the respondents to rate on a scale from 1 (less 
stability) to 5 (more stability) the classification that best suited their jurisdiction. The 
indicators to gauge the financial status of the municipality are extracted from the 
Financial Yearbook of Portuguese Local Governments edited by Carvalho, Fernandes, 
Jorge, and Camões (2006) and published by the Center for Research in Public Policy 
and Administration. Financial dependency is the proportion of central government 
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grants in total local revenues. Net debt is calculated as the total local budgetary balance. 
The first variable gauges long-term financial status of the local community, whereas the 
second variable is primarily a short-term measure of budgetary stress. 
In order to control for community characteristics, we employ a diverse set of 
indicators that taps into different aspects of local dynamics. Socioeconomic status is 
gauged by personal income per capita and by a social development index (SDI) 
calculated as the average of three indexes: life expectancy, educational level, and basic 
local infrastructure coverage. The SDI varies from 0 to 1. Demographic trends are 
accounted for by the rate of population growth, area, and population density. These 
indicators also control for possible scale economies associated with local service 
production. We control for the economic profile of the community by including the 
proportion of urban land use. Data was retrieved from the National Bureau of Statistics 
(INE, 2006). All variables and indicators are summarized in table 2 and descriptive 
statistics are included in table 3. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The dependent variable assumes one of three possible nominal outcomes: 
hierarchy (coded 1), market (coded 2), and networks/partnerships (coded 3). Table 4 
presents a complete description of our dependent variable, including the number of 
municipal governments providing each of the 42 services in our data set, as well as the 
production decisions associated with each of the services. Most services are produced 
through in-house bureaucracies. There are a few exceptions to this rule, namely 
electrical power, health care services, public transportation, and solid waste treatment. 
Out of 4242 possible provision decisions, the 101 local governments included in our 
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sample provide 2843 services, the vast majority produced by in-house bureaucracies or 
other hierarchical variations (77.7%). Markets are used in 319 cases (11.22%) and 
networks/partnerships in 315 (11.08%).   
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The literature indicates that the multinomial logit model is the most appropriate 
for estimating unordered, multi-category dependent variables, as this is an extension of 
the binary logit regression model when the dependent variable is no longer dichotomous 
but a nominal one (Borooah, 2002, Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Liao, 1994). The model 
assumes a reference category (in our case, hierarchy), and provides the odds, in 
probabilistic terms, of the other categories (market and networks) (Borooah, 2002, 
Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Liao, 1994). This econometric model uses maximum 
likelihood for estimating regression coefficients. This method is used in logit models 
because the errors do not follow a normal distribution and do not have constant 
variance. Robust standard errors are calculated with the Huber/White/Sandwich (HWS) 
variance estimator.  
Table 5 displays multinomial logit estimates for the choice of external provision 
by local decision-makers as an alternative to hierarchical, in-house solutions for the 
production of public goods and services. The assumption is that local officials prefer 
hierarchical solutions as a default, but the transaction costs factors influence the 
decision to externalize. Three specifications are included. The first specification is the 
full model including service characteristics, political environment, and control variables. 
The second specification incorporates service characteristics as the only set of 
independent variables and the third includes all economic and political transaction costs 
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variables. These specifications are included as a check for consistency in the behaviour 
of the coefficients and standard errors of the estimates.  
 
Findings  
 
The overall results confirm the theoretical expectations that transaction costs 
play a crucial role in the decision to externalize the production of local public services. 
The stronger result concerns service characteristics. Highly specific assets are 
externalized primarily using network/partnership mechanisms supporting the argument 
that there is less potential for opportunistic behaviour when contracting with other 
governments and nonprofit organisations (Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock, 2008). The 
evidence indicates that markets are the least preferred mechanism to produce highly 
specific assets, which also concurs prior findings (Carr, LeRoux and Shrestha, 2009; 
Nelson, 1997). 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Regarding service measurability, the results are even more unequivocal in terms 
of the theoretical prediction of transaction costs analysis. For complex services there is a 
clear preference for in-house production when market externalization is the alternative. 
The choice between hierarchical and network mechanisms is unclear as we do not find 
evidence that one is favoured over the other. In all, Portuguese local officials seem to 
prefer a more conservative approach in the production of complex services. The local 
bureaucracy or other arrangement under direct supervision of local officials is regarded 
as the best way to control service delivery when contracts are hard to write and enforce.   
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The findings concerning political transaction costs suggest that stability is 
associated with direct service provision through in-house bureaucracies, whereas 
political or administrative turmoil lead local officials to search for externalization 
options. This is inconsistent with the idea that political transaction costs hinder 
externalization, but supports the argument that local officials prefer external alternatives 
in the face of internal conflict as a circumvention strategy to avoid service disruptions or 
to shift blame to external providers (Clingermayer & Feiock, 1997; Feiock, 
Clingermayer, & Dasse, 2003; Hood, 2007; Tavares & Camões, 2010). 
The results concerning the impact of the financial status of the municipality 
upon externalization are worth analyzing. The strongest point that can be made is that as 
the level of financial dependency increases, the probability of adopting market solutions 
decreases compared to hierarchical mechanisms. Pallesen (2004) explains this situation 
using the expression ‘the politics of good times’. The author states that a good financial 
condition leads to the adoption of externalization because there is less friction caused by 
public unions at the local level. In Portugal, local governments that are highly 
dependent from central government transfers seem to display risk-averse strategies 
consistent with conservative preferences over service production alternatives. Under 
conditions of financial dependency and budgetary constraints the margin of error is 
extremely small and it does not allow local officials to engage in innovative and more 
uncertain options such as externalization. These findings are in line with the idea that 
officials resist experimenting with innovative mechanisms of governance and are also 
less enthusiastic regarding the adoption of New Public Management reforms (Rodrigues 
& Araújo, 2006). 
Concerning community characteristics, we anticipated that higher levels of 
socioeconomic and demographic changes could promote the use of both market and 
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network mechanisms. Table 5 confirms this expectation. The level of social 
development, per capita personal income, and the proportion of urban land are 
positively associated with the use of market mechanisms. The same conclusion is valid 
for the relationship between the percentage of urban land use and network mechanisms. 
Population density is the single finding that contradicts our prior expectations. One 
possible explanation for this counterintuitive result is that local officials in highly dense 
jurisdictions are able to secure scale economies by keeping service production in-house.   
 
[Table 6] 
 
Table 6 displays the relative risk ratios for the independent variables and the 
percentage change in predicted probabilities. The odds ratios or relative-risk ratios 
(RRR) represent the impact of each variable in the choice of external governance 
mechanisms compared to the base outcome (hierarchy). The percentage change in 
predicted probabilities is calculated by varying each independent variable from its 
minimum to its maximum observed value in the sample while setting the remaining 
independent variables at their means. The percentages indicate the increase or decrease 
in probability of external production compared to hierarchical/direct provision. 
The analysis of service characteristics confirms that economic transaction costs 
play an important role in the choice of governance mechanisms. As expected, more 
complex services are less likely to be contracted with private vendors. An increase in 
one unit in the difficulty of measurement scale reduces the probability of using market 
mechanisms as an alternative to hierarchy by 25 percent. On the other hand, higher 
levels of asset specificity promote the use of network mechanisms. Substantively, a one 
unit change in the asset specificity scale increases the likelihood of partnership/network 
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production by 55 percent. This effect is extremely strong, since the variation in 
predicted probabilities is close to 400%, increasing from 3.6% when asset specificity is 
at its minimum to 18.05% at the maximum value. 
 Analyzing political and administrative stability, we verify that in both cases, 
higher levels of stability promote the use of hierarchic mechanisms. While political 
stability is associated with a reduction in the likelihood of service production using 
network arrangements, administrative stability is primarily linked to less reliance on 
private sector firms. Both effects have similar magnitudes, indicating that 
externalization is preferred in jurisdictions dealing with internal turmoil.  
In spite of the robustness of the result, financial dependency has a negligible 
impact upon choice. In contrast, the effect of budgetary surplus upon contracting with 
networks/partnerships is the most impressive in our transaction costs analysis. Both 
findings support our hypothesis that externalization is more common in times of 
economic prosperity. The transaction costs associated with external service delivery, 
particularly the loss of political control over service production represent a lesser risk 
when budgetary surplus and financial independency are the norm.      
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
This work emphasizes both the economic transaction costs associated with 
service characteristics and the political transaction costs ensuing from the political arena 
where the outsourcing decision occurs. The analysis of Portuguese local service delivery 
confirms prior findings that service characteristics influence the decision concerning 
governance mechanisms (Brown and Potoski, 2003; Levin and Tadelis, 2007; Carr, 
LeRoux, and Shrestha, 2009). The externalization of services involving highly specific 
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assets favors contractual options involving less risks of opportunistic behavior, namely 
the use of partnerships with not-for-profit organisations or with other governments. 
Highly complex and hard-to-measure activities are more amenable for delivery through 
hierarchical mechanisms to avoid contractual agreements that are difficult to design and 
monitor. These results are aligned with the theoretical predictions of transaction costs 
analysis (Williamson, 1985; 1996) and supported by other recent empirical research 
(Carr, LeRoux, & Shrestha, 2009; Lamothe, Lamothe, & Feiock; see Bel & Fageda 
(2007) for a meta-analysis).   
The findings concerning political transaction costs represent a key contribution 
to the literature. Higher levels of political and administrative instability point to the 
adoption of market mechanisms and network partnerships rather than hierarchic 
mechanisms. These results can be understood in light of recent empirical work 
(Clingermayer & Feiock, 1997; Feiock, Clingermayer, Shrestha, & Dasse, 2007; 
Tavares & Camões 2010). Political instability leads to the externalization of services to 
shift responsibility for the provision to external agents. Once service provision is 
delegated to external actors, local officials can avoid blame for service disruptions.  
Public provision of municipal services can also be regarded as a delegation 
decision to help shed some light on these findings. If the municipality produces the 
service directly, the delegation of authority is hierarchical and the costs incurred by 
elected officials are associated with internal monitoring of subordinate behavior. When 
the service is produced by contract with other agents, the delegation of authority is 
external, and agency costs are involved in monitoring activities.  
Framing contracting out as a delegation decision is not entirely new in the 
literature. Andrew Whitford (2010) suggests that the delegation to sub-national units in 
a federalist system can be cast as a theory of franchising, where the delegation of power 
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involves both constraints to franchisee behaviour and limitations to cross-franchise 
negative externalities. Likewise, the externalization of services entails franchise-like 
properties since it secures efficiency gains from market competition and coordination 
benefits from hierarchical authority. 
Hence, local government officials regard the delegation decision as a trade-off 
between different types of transaction costs. Externalization is favoured when the 
inefficiencies resulting from agency costs and loss of political control to the external 
provider are surmounted by the presence of significant political transaction costs 
associated with in-house production. Contracting becomes the logical response to 
circumvent not only political and/or administrative turmoil, but also to address 
environmental turbulence. Highly dynamic and complex political environments lead to 
the adoption of market mechanisms and networks replacing traditional production using 
in-house bureaucracies. Externalization alternatives appear more frequently in more 
urban settings experiencing economic prosperity and significant population growth 
because these solutions are better at addressing preference diversity. In contrast, 
hierarchical solutions are preferred when political transaction costs are low compared to 
economic transaction costs associated with contracting decisions.  
In sum, the results indicate that both service characteristics and political contexts 
are determinants of externalization decisions, underlining the resistance of Portuguese 
local governments to implement New Public Management reforms as a fashion. 
Whenever New Public Management governance mechanisms are adopted, it has been 
because they are regarded as appropriate management tools to provide specific services, 
not simply to mimic practices in other jurisdictions. Future work should provide more 
detail concerning the choice of governance mechanisms in specific service areas such as 
public works, economic development, and social services. 
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One important limitation of our study is associated with capturing the actual 
decision-making process followed by local government officials. In fact, officials have 
first to decide whether or not to provide a service to their constituents and only after a 
positive answer to this question will they engage in studying alternative production 
modes. Although this thought process is frequently recognized in theory, research 
designs have systematically failed to address this fact. This would require a selection 
model where the first equation estimates the determinants of the decision to provide the 
service and the second equation employs a nominal dependent variable to reflect the 
production decision. Currently, standard statistical software packages do not allow the 
sequential treatment of provision and production decisions, but it is important to 
recognize this limitation in the research design in order to correct it in future work. 
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Table 1. Service arrangement alternatives and governance mechanisms  
Direct Control Competition Inter-organisational cooperation 
Service 
Arrangement 
(Governance 
Mechanism) 
Service 
delivery 
through direct 
orders of 
political 
leaders 
Capacity of 
local 
government 
to nominate 
the CEO 
Budget and 
personnel 
integrated in 
the local 
government 
structure 
Relations 
based on a 
legal 
contract 
Competitive 
environment 
when 
establishing 
relations with 
local 
government 
Decision 
Making involve 
many actors 
besides local 
government 
officials 
Shared 
information 
and 
resources 
Municipal 
Services (HTM) ++ ++ ++ -- -- -- -- 
Municipalized 
Services (HTM) ++ ++ +/- -- -- -- -- 
Municipal 
Enterprises 
(HTM) 
+ ++ - -- -- -- -- 
Contracting-out 
(MTM) -- -- -- ++ ++ - - 
Franchise 
(MTM) -- -- -- ++ ++ - - 
Mixed 
Commercial 
Societies (MTM) 
-- +/- - + + + + 
Inter-municipal 
Enterprises 
(NTM) 
- ++ - -- -- + + 
Municipal 
Commercial 
Societies  (NTM) 
-- ++ - + - - - 
Public 
Commercial 
Societies (NTM) 
-- + - + - + + 
Partnerships 
(NTM) -- -- -- - - + ++ 
Local 
Government 
Associations 
(NTM) 
- ++ -- -- -- ++ ++ 
Metropolitan 
Associations 
(NTM) 
- ++ -- -- -- ++ ++ 
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Table 2. Variable description, expected signs and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Governance 
Mechanism 
Dependent Variable; Measures the choice between 
alternatives. Takes the values of 1=Hierarchy; 
2=Market; 3=Network. 
Direct Survey to Municipalities 
(2008) 
Asset Specificity Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). Survey (2008) 
Service Complexity Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high).   Survey (2008) 
Political Stability Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). Survey (2008) 
Administrative 
Stability 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (low) to 5 (high). Survey (2008) 
Financial 
Dependency 
Financial dependency is the proportion of central 
government grants in total local revenues.  
Financial Yearbook (2006) 
Net Debt Total local budgetary balance (a negative number is 
a deficit).  
Financial Yearbook (2006) 
ISD Index of social development as measured by 
Portuguese government.  
INE (2006) 
Income Personal income per capita INE (2006) 
Population Growth  Rate of population growth (2001-2006)  INE (2006) 
Area Area in square kilometers INE (2006) 
Population Density Population per square kilometer.  INE (2006) 
Urban Land Proportion of urban land in total area INE (2006) 
 
Table 3. Independent Variables Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Asset specificity 3.40 .98 5 0 
Service complexity 2.65 1.12 5 0 
Political stability 4.54 .64 5 3 
Administrative stability 4.48 .59 5 3 
Financial dependency .37 .21 .87 .07 
Net debt     
Social Development Index .90 .024 .94 .831 
Income per capita 731.57 161.4 1523.05 546.13 
Population growth rate .34 6.82 24.47 -10.44 
Area 302.12 251.25 1232.94 7.94 
Population density 377.27 853.78 6015.50 10.49 
Proportion of urban land .12 .14 .635 .004 
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Table 4. Provision and Production Choices for 42 Services 
Provision Production Decision 
Services 
Service 
Provided Hierarchy Market Network 
Airports 12 (11.88%) 9 (75.00%) 2 (16.67%) 1 (8.33%) 
Ambulance /EMS 56 (55.45%) 30 (53.57%) 1 (1.79%) 25 (44.64%) 
Animal Control 59 (58.42%) 42 (71.19%) 1 (1.69%) 16 (27.12%) 
Beautification 92 (91.09%) 78 (84.78%) 12 (13.04%) 2 (2.17%) 
Building Maintenance 71 (70.30%) 60 (84.51%) 11 (15.49%) 0 (0.00%) 
Building Security 67 (66.34%) 44 (65.67%) 23 (34.33%) 0 (0.00%) 
Canteen service provision 40 (39.60%) 29 (72.50%) 8 (20.00%) 3 (7.50%) 
Cemetery Services 89 (88.2%) 87 (97.75%) 2 (2.25%) 0 (0.00%) 
Childcare services 74 (73.27%) 69 (93.24%) 1 (1.35%) 4 (5.41%) 
City Planning 98 (97.03%) 95 (96.94%) 2 (2.04%) 1 (1.02%) 
Code enforcement 87 (86.14%) 84 (96.55%) 2 (2.30%) 1 (1.15%) 
Convention centres and 
auditoriums 78 (77.23%) 72 (92.31%) 1 (1.28%) 5 (6.41%) 
Economic/industrial facilities 34 (33.66%) 28 (82.35%) 1 (2.94%) 5 (14.71%) 
Electricity 46 (45.54%) 3 (6.52%) 32 (69.57%) 11 (23.91%) 
Foreign relations 56 (55.45%) 52 (92.86%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (7.14%) 
Health care services 35 (34.65%) 8 (22.86%) 13 (37.14%) 14 (40.00%) 
Housing 69 (68.32%) 65 (94.20%) 0 (0.00%) 4 (5.80%) 
Industrial facilities 44 (43.56%) 39 (88.64%) 4 (9.09%) 1 (2.27%) 
Library 87 (86.14%) 87 (100.00%) 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 
Museums 57 (56.44%) 56 (98.25%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (1.75%) 
Parking services 42 (41.58%) 30 (71.43%) 12 (28.57%) 0 (0.00%) 
Parking structures and facilities 57 (56.44%) 47 (82.46%) 10 (17.54%) 0 (0.00%) 
Police 17 (16.83%) 16 (94.12%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (5.88%) 
Poverty prevention programs 79 (78.22%) 57 (72.15%) 0 (0.00%) 22 (27.85%) 
Public Bus System 47 (46.53%) 19 (40.43%) 27 (57.45%) 1 (2.13%) 
Recreation facilities 89 (88.12%) 83 (93.26%) 2 (2.25%) 4 (4.49%) 
Road Maintenance 85 (84.16%) 56 (65.88%) 29 (34.12%) 0 (0.00%) 
School bus 89 (88.12%) 58 (65.17%) 28 (31.46%) 3 (3.37%) 
School management  82 (81.19%) 79 (96.34%) 2 (2.44%) 1 (1.22%) 
Senior centre 68 (67.33%) 38 (55.88%) 3 (4.41%) 27 (39.71%) 
Sewage treatment 85 (84.16%) 42 (49.41%) 16 (18.82%) 27 (31.76%) 
Solid Waste collection 92 (91.09%) 45 (48.91%) 22 (23.91%) 25 (27.17%) 
Solid Waste treatment 90 (89.11%) 10 (11.11%) 19 (21.11%) 61 (67.78%) 
Stadiums and arenas 62 (61.39%) 52 (83.87%) 4 (6.45%) 6 (9.68%) 
Street cleaning  79 (78.22%) 69 (87.34%) 6 (7.59%) 4 (5.06%) 
Theatres 55 (54.46%) 53 (96.36%) 1 (1.82%) 1 (1.82%) 
Tourism promotion 92 (91.09%) 85 (92.39%) 1 (1.09%) 6 (6.52%) 
Traffic control and planning 82 (81.19%) 80 (97.56%) 1 (1.22%) 1 (1.22%) 
Urban re-qualification 73 (72.28%) 70 (95.89%) 0 (0.00%) 3 (4.11%) 
Veterinary services 86 (85.15%) 79 (91.86%) 5 (5.81%) 2 (2.33%) 
Water distribution 95 (94.06%) 68 (71.58%) 12 (12.63%) 15 (15.79%) 
Youth development 46 (45.54%) 36 (78.26%) 3 (6.52%) 7 (15.22%) 
Total Provision (N=101) 2843 2209 (77.70%) 319 (11.22%) 315 (11.08%) 
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Table 5. Multinomial Logit Regression Explaining Service Delivery Arrangements (Base Category: Hierarchy) 
 Market Production Network/Partnership Market Production Network/Partnership Market Production Network/Partnership 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient  
(RSE) 
Coefficient 
(RSE) 
Coefficient  
(RSE) 
Coefficient  
(RSE) 
Coefficient  
(RSE) 
Asset specificity 
 
-.124 
(.082) 
.435*** 
(.087) 
-.092 
(.080) 
.445*** 
(.088) 
-.151* 
(.079) 
.408*** 
(.083) 
Service 
complexity 
-.293*** 
(.077) 
-.042 
(.071) 
-.274*** 
(.079) 
-.052 
(.069) 
-.252*** 
(.078) 
-.020 
(.066) 
Political stability 
 
-.191 
(.137) 
-.448*** 
(.145) 
-.269** 
(.122) 
-.310** 
(.126) 
  
Administrative 
stability 
-.257* 
(.143) 
.062 
(.158) 
-.060 
(.131) 
-.043 
(.138) 
  
Financial 
dependency 
-3.267*** 
(.803) 
-.788 
(.853) 
.424 
(.327) 
.016 
(.393) 
  
Net debt 
 
-.000 
(-.000) 
.000** 
(.000) 
-.000*** 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
  
Social 
Development 
Index 
27.2*** 
(7.97) 
-2.75 
(6.86) 
    
Income per 
capita 
.002** 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
    
Population 
growth rate 
-.002 
(.018) 
.030* 
(.016) 
    
Area 
 
.000 
(.000) 
.001* 
(.000) 
    
Population 
density 
-.001** 
(.000) 
-.001** 
(.000) 
    
Proportion of 
urban land 
2.88** 
(1.24) 
3.36*** 
(1.19) 
    
Constant 
-23.9*** 
(7.03) 
.633 
(5.90) 
.407 
(.667) 
-1.87*** 
(.682) 
-.838*** 
(.274) 
-3.35*** 
(.310) 
Observations 
Wald chi2 (24) 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2 
2071 
131.26 
0.000 
0.045 
2071 
72.63 
0.000 
0.027 
2143 
47.68 
0.000 
0.021 
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Table 6. Relative Risk Ratio Values and Marginal Effects  
 Hierarchy versus Market Production Hierarchy versus Partnerships/Networks 
 RRR Percentage Change in  
Predicted Probabilities 
from Minimum to 
Maximum Values 
RRR Percentage Change in  
Predicted Probabilities 
from Minimum to 
Maximum Values 
Asset 
specificity 
.884  1.55*** 394.52% 
Service 
complexity 
.746*** -64.77% .956  
Political 
stability 
.826  .639*** -52.21% 
Administrative 
stability 
.774* -37.38% 1.06  
Financial 
dependency 
.038*** -0.91% .455  
Net debt 1.00  1.00** 811.15% 
Social 
Development 
Index 
6.26e+11*** 1110.31% 0.064  
Income per 
capita 
1.002** 421.39% 0.999  
Population 
growth rate 
0.998  1.030* 151.72% 
Area 
 
1.000  1.001* 69.59% 
Population 
density 
0.999** -94.43% 0.999** -98.49% 
Proportion of 
urban land 
17.903** 227.02% 28.648*** 325.57% 
The predicted probabilities of each production alternative: hierarchy (80.3%), market (9.83%) and 
networks/partnerships (9.87%). The percentage change in predicted probabilities is calculated by varying 
each independent variable from its minimum to its maximum observed value and setting the remaining 
independent variables at their means. The percentages indicate the increase or decrease in probability of 
external production compared to hierarchical/direct provision.  *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed 
tests. 
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